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COMMENTS
NON-JURY TRIAL OF CIVIL LITIGATION: JUSTIFYING A
COMPLEXITY EXCEPTION TO THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT*
The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution states that
"[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."' When Con-
gress enacted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the right to jury trial
at common law remained undisturbed.2
As the complexity of civil litigation has increased, however, support has
grown for an interpretation of the seventh amendment which would allow
a court to deny a timely demand for trial by jury in a highly complicated
lawsuit.3 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held in In
re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation4 that "due process
precludes trial by jury when a jury is unable to perform [its] task with a
reasonable understanding of the evidence and the legal rules."' 5 This deci-
sion came after a Ninth Circuit ruling to the contrary.
The purpose of this Comment is to demonstrate that under exceptional
circumstances7 a court may deny a jury trial without violating the seventh
amendment. Part I focuses on the inadequacies of jurors as factfinders
* The author wishes to thank W. Hamilton Bryson, Professor of Law, T.C. Williams
School of Law, University of Richmond, for providing certain research materials used in
preparing this article.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
2. "The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution
or as given by a statute of the United States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate."
FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a). "[C]ases triable by jury prior to the passage of the Federal Rules
remained jury actions, and causes previously heard in equity continued to be adjudicated by
the courts." Note, Jury Trials in Complex Litigation, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 751, 763 (1979).
3. "Notwithstanding the rhetoric extolling the importance of the jury in our democratic
society, some commentators have attacked the right to a jury trial, especially in civil cases,
as prolonging a system in which incompetents are assigned to tasks they are unlikely to
perform well." Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial Judge,
64 VA. L. REv. 1, 20 (1978) (emphasis added).
4. 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
5. Id. at 1084.
6. In re United States Financial Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 929 (1980) [hereinafter cited as United States Financial].
7. See notes 11-18 infra and accompanying text.
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and decisionmakers in a complex civil case. Part II of this article dis-
cusses recent decisions in which lower federal courts have approved the
complexity exception to the seventh amendment jury mandate in some
instances.5 Emphasis is placed on the language of Ross v. Bernhard,9 a
Supreme Court decision frequently cited in support of the complexity ex-
ception. In Part III, an examination of the seventh amendment from a
historical perspective yields the conclusion that striking a demand for
jury trial in complex civil cases is consistent with the practices of the
English courts of equity during the eighteenth century.10 Finally, Part IV
of this Comment discusses how the demands of due process reinforce the
argument in favor of bench trials in complex civil cases.
I. JURY INCOMPETENCE
A. Complexity Defined
Prior to any discussion of a jury's inability to serve as factfinder in a
complex civil case, it is necessary to define the term "complexity" as it
relates to judicial proceedings. In a broad sense, "[a] suit is too complex
for a jury when circumstances render the jury unable to decide in a
proper manner."'11 Several factors merit consideration before a judge can
conclude that a particular case is beyond the capabilities of a jury. 2
These factors can be divided into three categories: the overall dimensions
of the trial, the nature of the proposed evidence, and the difficulty of the
applicable law.13
With respect to the first factor, the judge should consider the number
of parties, claims, witnesses 24 and exhibits,1 5 and estimate the probable
8. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980) [hereinafter
cited as Japanese Elec. Prods.]; ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp.
423 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (seventh amendment issue held moot because trial court directed ver-
dict), aff'd sub noma. Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as ILC Peripherals]; In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash.
1976).
9. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
10. A modern-day litigant is not entitled to a jury trial if, at the time the seventh amend-
ment was added to our Constitution, his case would have been tried in equity. See notes 87-
133 infra and accompanying text.
11. 631 F.2d at 1079.
12. See Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92 HARv. L. REv.
898, 898-99 (1979).
13. Brief for Amicus Curiae IBM Corp. at 46-48, Rosen v. Dick, 639 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.
1980).
14. See, e.g., ILC Peripherals, supra note 8, at 444. There, the judge ruled that, in the
event of a retrial on remand, plaintiff's jury demand would be stricken because, inter alia,
eighty-seven witnesses testified in the original proceeding.
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length of trial."0 As far as evidentiary matters are concerned, the trial
court should determine whether the average juror could comprehend tes-
timony dealing with those sophisticated concepts crucial to the case.17 Fi-
nally, the trial court should anticipate the difficulty an average juror
would experience when attempting to interpret and apply unfamiliar,
complicated law to a confusing set of facts.' If proper analysis of these
criteria reveals that a jury could not reach a rational decision, then the
proceeding may be regarded as a complex case.
B. Disadvantages of Trial by Jury
1. Problems with Composition
Although the civil jury format has enjoyed a prominent position
throughout the history of the Anglo-American judicial system, 9 trial by
jury poses serious problems in the realm of complex cases.20 One concern
is the difficulty of selecting qualified individuals for jury service. Two
commentators have concluded that those best equipped to weigh the evi-
15. See, e.g., In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. at 101 (court sustained defen-
dants' motion to strike the jury demand, noting that over 900,000 documents had been pro-
duced by the parties); ILC Peripherals, supra note 8, at 444 (judge decided to deny a jury
trial if remanded partly because of the introduction of 2300 exhibits during the initial trial).
16. See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prod., supra note 8, at 1073 (in reversing district
judge's ruling that a complexity exception is without merit, circuit court noted that trial was
expected to last one year); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 63 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (court's conservative estimate of four months for trial was a major factor in the deci-
sion to deny jury trial); ILC Peripherals, supra note 8, at 444 (judge's ruling that there
would be no jury in the event of a retrial was influenced by the five month duration of the
original trial); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. at 104 (court granted defen-
dant's motion to strike a jury demand because, inter alia, the estimated length of trial was 4
to 6 months). But see United States Financial, supra note 6, at 416 n.13 (court reversed the
trial judge's order denying a jury in spite of an estimated duration of two years for trial).
17. See, e.g., ILC Peripherals, supra note 8, at 446 (court noted that certain accounting
practices and engineering principles were beyond the understanding of a typical jury).
18. See, e.g., Japanese Elec. Prods., supra note 8. In this proceeding the court observed
that "when the jury is unable to determine the normal application of the law to the facts of
a case and reaches a verdict on the basis of nothing more than its own determination of
community wisdom and values, its operation is indistinguishable from arbitrary and unprin-
cipled decisionmaking." 631 F.2d at 1085. See also SEC v. Associated Minerals, Inc., 75
F.R.D. 724 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (court observed that issues governing the interpretation and
application of the securities laws were so complex as not to be suited for jury trial).
19. C. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 39 (1962)..
20. "When [Blackstone and Holdsworth] glorified'the jury system ... it is improbable
that they had anticipated the possibility of jurors facing protracted antitrust litigation in-
volving giant corporations or federal agencies arguing complex market theory." Oakes, The
Right to Strike the Jury Trial Demand in Complex Litigation, 34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 243,
252 (1980).
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dence in a complex case are least likely to be chosen for jury duty.
There is no doubt that persons who might be best able to deal with the
difficult issues involved in these complex cases, such as management person-
nel, accountants, business people and engineers, will invariably be excused
from service at lengthy trials because of undue hardship. Employed persons
cannot abandon their careers for large periods of time and few employers
would tolerate such absences. 21
In addition, it is very difficult to maintain a continuous jury in pro-
tracted civil litigation.22 The longer a trial continues, the more likely it is
that a particular member of the jury will be unable to serve throughout
the entire proceeding because of death, infirmity, permanent withdrawal
from the jurisdiction or some other obstacle. It has been suggested that
additional jurors or alternates can remedy this situation, but these addi-
tions could create new problems, particularly in supervising and guaran-
teeing the attendance of the extra jurors.23
A third cause for concern lies in the service of reluctant jurors in pro-
tracted, complex trials. Unwilling individuals whom the court inconve-
niences by compelling their lengthy service will feel resentment and frus-
tration after sacrificing months of their time. Their negative attitude may
lead to a biased or irrational decision. 24 The Third Circuit found this phe-
nomenon particularly disturbing.25
2. Problems in Decisionmaking
Although a jury may, in rare situations, consist wholly of individuals of
high intelligence, critics remain concerned about the jury's inability to
review the evidence and render a fair decision in a complex proceeding. In
the words of one member of the San Francisco Bar:
21. Harris & Liberman, Can the Jury Survive the Complex Antitrust Case?, 24 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 611, 625 (1979); accord, Japanese Elec. Prods., supra note 8, at 1086; SHEPARW's
MANUAL OF FEDERAL PRACTICE § 7.19 (Supp. 1980).
A litigant who demands trial by jury is entitled to a factfinding body composed of mem-
bers "selected at random from a fair cross section of the community." 28 U.S.C. § 1861
(1976). However, when individuals with more impressive demographic profiles are normally
excluded from service, neither side enjoys the benefit of this statutory protection. Although
the party demanding a jury may not object due to some perceived tactical advantage in
having laymen resolve a complex dispute, the outcome violates the spirit of the law.
22. Note, The Right to an Incompetent Jury: Protracted Commercial Litigation and the
Seventh Amendment, 10 CONN. L. REV. 775, 778 (1978).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 776-77. See notes 26-37 infra and accompanying text.
25. "A long trial can . . . strain [a juror's] commitment to the jury's task." 631 F.2d at
1086.
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It is difficult to imagine a less appropriate mechanism for the determina-
tion of facts in a protracted and complicated suit than the civil jury. Be-
cause of the quantitative scale of most antitrust, securities and class action
cases, and because the intellectual effort called for defies comprehension by
a jury wholly inexperienced in the resolution of such matters, a jury is sim-
ply unqualified to participate in such cases.
28
Jurors have admitted that their lack of legal and technical training im-
pairs their ability to reach rational decisions. The court in ILC Peripher-
als Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp.27 focused on the frustration of the jurors
themselves in their efforts to resolve the case at bar.2" After deliberating
for nineteen days, the jury was hopelessly deadlocked. Accordingly, the
trial judge declared a mistrial, granted defendant's motion for a directed
verdict, and entered an order to the effect that in the event of a retrail on
remand, plaintiff's jury demand would not be honored. Judge Conti noted
the jurors' apparent difficulty in grasping the concepts of the case. He
asked the foreman whether such cases should be tried before a jury. The
foreman responded, "[i]f you can find a jury that's both a computer tech-
nician, a lawyer, an economist, knows all about that stuff, yes, I think you
could have a qualified jury, but we don't know anything about that. '29
The use of a jury in a complex civil case is not without its proponents.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a strongly-worded portion
of its opinion in In re United States Financial Securities Litigation0
declared that the criticism of civil juries "unnecessarily and improperly
demeans the intelligence of the citizens of this Nation. 2 31 In that court's
view, the burden is on the attorneys 2 and the trial judge32 to conduct the
26. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation - Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D.
199, 208 (1976). "No matter how kindly one views the jury there is no question that at times
its verdict represents fiction and not fact." 5 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE % 38.02 (2d ed.
1980). See Brief for Amicus Curiae IBM Corp. at 29, Japanese Elec. Prods.; accord, J.
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 119 (1949).
27. 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
28. Id. at 444.
29. Id. at 447.
30. 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979).
31. Id. at 430.
32. "Whether a case involves computer technology, aircraft design, or accounting, attor-
neys must still educate the uninitiated about the matters presented in their case." Id. at
431. Judge Higginbotham of the Northern District of Texas believes that a jury actually
imposes a discipline on the lawyers to become well-versed in their arguments.
The process of distilling complex material into a comprehensible form operates less
effectively in bench trials than in jury trials .... The virtue of forcing counsel to
organize a complex mass of information into a form understandable by the uniniti-
ated is that counsel ultimately must understand the issues and evidence in the case
well enough to teach. If counsel cannot comprehensibly present their case to lay per-
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proceedings in a manner designed to foster rational factfinding. The
Ninth Circuit referred to several pretrial devices which can be useful in
simplifying a complex case: dismissal for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted,3 4 granting summary judgment 5 or separate
trials, encouraging settlements, appointing a master, 6 and obtaining sum-
maries of and stipulations as to the evidence.3 7 Nevertheless, some cases
remain too complex for jury determination regardless of a court's pursuit
of simplification." Given these circumstances, the only realistic alterna-
tive is to strike the demand for jury trial and try the case with the judge
sitting as factfinder s9
sons, is it likely that counsel do, in fact, understand their case?
Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation of Judicial Power,
56 TEx. L. REV. 47, 54 (1977).
The implication of Judge Higginbotham's rhetorical question may be refuted by a simple
analogy. A university physics professor may be able to explain a highly advanced concept to
a group of physics majors such that the students grasp it. However, a group of seventh
graders may find it impossible to follow the same explanation because the concept cannot be
reduced to "simple" form. Is there any doubt that this failure to comprehend is due to the
concept and not to the professor?
33. The Ninth Circuit suggests that the judge can direct the course of a complex case
through the use of the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, a publication specifically devel-
oped for difficult trials. 609 F.2d at 427.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
36. "A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. In actions to be tried
by a jury, a reference shall be made only when the issues are complicated . . . ." FED. R.
Civ. P. 53(b); cf. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (The
court concluded that "any role that a Special Master might be able to play in this case is so
peripheral that the underlying complexities will necessarily remain.").
37. 609 F.2d at 428. It has been argued that the trial court can minimize the risk of an
irrational decision by granting a motion for a directed verdict or for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict. The Third Circuit rejects these remedies as ineffective. "[T]he court can
only ensure that the jury will return one of a range of possible verdicts that the court finds
reasonably but minimally supported by the evidence." 631 F.2d at 1087-88 (emphasis
added).
38. Brief for Amicus Curiae IBM Corp. at 11, Rosen v. Dick, 639 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1980).
Evidence suggests that even explanatory testimony of experts does not reliably help lay
jurors to understand concepts crucial to their verdicts. Note, supra note 12, at 909-10.
39. "The most effective method of dealing with the problem... would be to change the
jury - to employ special juries competent to decide extraordinarily complex cases." Note,
supra note 12, at 915. However, the use of special juries may run afoul of constitutional
mandates regarding jury selection. Id. at 916-17. "Absent [a group of expert investigators],
theory would say that the next best factfinder is the judge due to his experience in dealing
with facts, with the credibility of the diverse persons who appear as witnesses, and with the
stratagems and wiles of practicing lawyers." 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.02 (2d ed.
1980).
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C. Advantages of Bench Trials
There are several reasons why a judge is preferable to a jury as
factfinder in a complex case. Usually, he is more intelligent than the typi-
cal juror. Moreover, a judge receives valuable training and experience
before and during his tenure on the bench.40 "[His] experience can enable
him to digest a large amount of evidence and legal argument, segregate
distinct issues and evidence relevant to each issue, assess the opinions of
expert witnesses, and apply highly complex legal standards to the facts of
the case."41
In addition to these personal and professional attributes, the trial judge
has at his disposal various aids which enable him to wade through the
complex civil case.42 These tools include law clerks and a secretarial staff,
trial transcripts for review, procedural controls over the trial, and the op-
portunity to question witnesses with respect to confusing testimony.43 Ju-
ries are either unable or unwilling to use these resources. Although a
bench trial may not be the ideal manner in which to try a complex case,44
clearly the judge is in a better position than a jury to render a rational
verdict.
Some commentators fear that acceptance of a complexity exception will
give trial judges unbridled discretion to strike jury demands in allegedly
complex cases.45 These observers argue that this perceived harm is com-
pounded because a decision to strike a jury demand will be completely
unreviewable. 4 The dissenting judge in Japanese Electronic Products as-
serted that the remedy of mandamus is inadequate because "formalistic
application of the factors [concerning the determination of complexity]
will result in holding that the trial court acted within bounds of its per-
missible discretion. 47 Judge Gibbons argued that, if the decision to strike
the jury demand is challenged through an appeal, the circuit court will be
reluctant to order a retrial in an otherwise error-free proceeding after a
40. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 8 (1966); Harris & Lieberman, supra
note 21, at 622.
41. 631 F.2d at 1087. But cf. United States Financial, supra note 6, at 431 (The court
observed that "[w]hile we express great confidence in the abilities of judges, no one has yet
demonstrated how one judge can be a superior fact-finder to the knowledge and experience
that citizen-jurors bring to bear on a case.").
42. Harris & Liberman, supra note 21, at 622.
43. Id. at 623.
44. See note 39 supra.
45. See Note, supra note 2, at 771. Opponents of a complexity exception argue that such
discretion was "not intended by the framers of the seventh amendment." Id.
46. 631 F.2d at 1093 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
47. Id.
1981]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
verdict has been rendered. 8
Apprehension that a complexity exception will be tantamount to an
erosion of seventh amendment rights is unfounded. Most judges favor us-
ing a jury whenever possible.4 9 Furthermore, judges are usually familiar
with the relative strengths and weaknesses of juries and can make in-
formed decisions regarding the propriety of seating a jury in a particular
case.50 "If the courts restrain themselves in this determination-and
there is no reason to believe they will not-then the number of such ex-
ceptional cases will remain limited, and will not affect the basic right to a
jury trial in the vast number of ordinary civil cases."51
H. THE IMPACT OF Ross v. BERNHARD 52
Two federal district courts" have struck demands for jury trials based
upon their respective applications of the three-pronged test enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Ross v. Bernhard.5 4 Although the results in
these cases seem proper, it appears that these courts failed to appreciate
the true significance of the Ross analysis. It is necessary to examine the
development of the Ross test as well as its application in subsequent
cases in order to understand that the Ross test is not a new approach but
a unified restatement of rules applied throughout Anglo-American legal
history.55
48. Id. The dissenting opinion fails to note that the trial judge can certify the question for
an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). This procedure was invoked
by the district courts in Japanese Elec. Prods. and United States Financial. See Note,
supra note 12, at 914.
49. Note, supra note 12, at 913.
50. 631 F.2d at 1088.
51. Harris & Liberman, supra note 21, at 637 (emphasis added). The Third Circuit ac-
knowledged that courts should employ a "high standard" and deny juries only when due
process clearly requires a non-jury trial. 631 F.2d at 1088.
52. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
53. ILC Peripherals, supra note 8; In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D.
Wash. 1976).
54. 396 U.S. at 538 n.10. The test is designed to determine the "legal" or "equitable"
nature of an issue and is revealed in the text accompanying note 67 infra.
55. See Part III infra. Several commentators and courts argue that the Ross test provides
a new method of addressing the central question. However, the author subscribes to a differ-
ent interpretation. "The proper analysis evidences ... that the considerations of the Ross
test were always part of the English common law procedure." Comment, The Right to Trial
by Jury: Old English Law Supports a Complexity Exception to the Seventh Amendment,
11 SETON HALL L. Rav. 31, 54 (1980).
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A. The Beacon Theatres, Dairy Queen, Ross Trilogy
The Court expanded the right to jury trial under the seventh amend-
ment in a series of cases. The first of these, Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover,56 involved the antitrust laws. The plaintiff sought declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief, claims traditionally within a court's equity
jurisdiction. The defendant counterclaimed, raising issues at law. Some of
these issues were identical to claims in the original complaint. Beacon
invoked its right to a jury trial of the legal issues in its counterclaim. The
plaintiff argued that no right to a jury attached since the issues were orig-
inally raised in a suit at equity. The district court denied a jury trial of
those issues common to the complaint and the counterclaim before ren-
dering judgment on the latter. In reversing this decision, the Supreme
Court held that the defendant did not lose the right to jury trial on those
common issues merely because the plaintiff arrived at the courthouse
first.57
The Court later decided Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood.5 8 In that case, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant had breached their contract for the
use of a trademark. The plaintiff sought temporary and permanent in-
junctions against defendant's use of the trademark, an accounting of
money allegedly due the plaintiff, a judgment for that amount and an
injunction pendente lite against certain other activity. The district court
struck defendant's demand for a jury trial because, inter alia, it deemed
the action purely equitable.59 That decision was overturned by the Su-
preme Court. Although the complaint sought an "accounting" (an equita-
ble remedy), the Court held that "the constitutional right to trial by jury
cannot be made to depend on the choice of words used in the plead-
ings." 60 The Court held that the essence of the action was a suit for
money judgment and that the district court erred in denying a jury trial.61
56. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
57. Id. at 508-11. The effect of this ruling was to severely restrict the "equitable clean-up
doctrine." Prior to Beacon Theatres, a party could be denied trial by jury whenever the
equity court was regarded as having quasi-ancillary jurisdiction over subordinate legal issues
which were part of an equitable action.
It is important to note that the Court did not address the problem of complexity in Bea-
con Theatres. It discussed issues which had already been categorized as either legal or equi-
table in nature. In re United States Financial Sec. Litig., 75 F.R.D. 702, 710 (S.D. Cal.
1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
58. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
59. An accounting constitutes an equitable remedy which triggers equity jurisdiction. See
notes 100 & 101 infra and accompanying text.
60. 369 U.S. at 477-78.
61. Id. at 478-79.
1981]
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Thus, the Supreme Court served notice that it would look behind the
language of a complaint to ascertain whether one is entitled to a jury
trial. 2
Ross v. Bernhard"3 was the final decision in this line of cases. The
plaintiffs brought a derivative action against the directors of a closed-end
investment company. Historically, shareholders were not permitted to sue
corporate officers and directors in actions at law.6 Nevertheless, the
Court ruled that the "right to jury trial attaches to those issues in deriva-
tive actions as to which the corporation, if it had been suing in its own
right, would have been entitled to a jury." 5 The majority opinion noted
that "[tihe Seventh Amendment question depends on the nature of the
issue to be tried rather than the character of the overall action."6 The
Court expounded upon this general assertion in what has become known
as "Footnote 10": "As our cases indicate, the 'legal' nature of an issue is
determined by considering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference to
such questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abili-
ties and limitations of juries.'6 7 These factors constitute the Ross test.
Reaction to this formula has been mixed. Some argue that the consider-
ation of jury limitations in Ross was not a departure from the historical
test 68 which has been used in the past to interpret the seventh amend-
ment.6 9 They point out that Ross was decided at a time when the Court
62. "[Tlhe constitutional right to trial by jury cannot be made to depend upon the choice
of words used in the pleadings." Id. at 477-78. Again the Court did not address the question
of whether a complexity exception to the seventh amendment exists.
63. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
64. Id. at 534. In time, however, equity courts began allowing shareholders to pursue a
remedy in a derivative action. Id.
65. Id. at 532-33.
"The historical rule preventing a court of law from entertaining a shareholder's suit
on behalf of the corporation is obsolete; it is no longer tenable for a district court,
administering both law and equity in the same action to deny legal remedies to a
corporation, merely because the corporation's spokesmen are its shareholders rather
than its directors."
Id. at 540.
66. Id. at 538.
67. Id. at 538 n.10 (emphasis added).
68. The historical test in essence includes considerations of the first and second factors in
Ross. A detailed discussion of the historical test is found in Part III infra.
69. "[T]his fleeting expression ... of infidelity to the centrality of the traditional histori-
cal test in seventh amendment determinations would hardly justify an announcement that
the historical test has been superseded in the federal courts." Wolfram, The Constitutional
History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MNN. L. Rav. 639, 645 (1973); accord, United
States Financial, supra note 6, at 425; C. WRIGHT, LAW op FEDERAL CouRTs § 92 (3d ed.
1976) (quoting Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irration-
906 [Vol. 15:897
JUSTIFYING A COMPLEXITY EXCEPTION
was expanding the rights of litigants under the seventh amendment.
"Since Ross itself was a landmark in this trend it seems incongruous to
seize upon [Footnote 10] as a basis for a rather broad restriction of the
right to jury trial."'10 Critics point out that the Court failed to apply the
third factor in deciding Ross itself and in subsequent cases employing the
Ross analysis. 1
Others believe that the third element of the Ross test opens the door to
a complexity exception. According to the Third Circuit, the Supreme
Court has recognized the possibility that a jury's limitations may restrict
the types of suits which fall within the scope of the seventh amendment. 2
Under certain circumstances a weighing of the Ross criteria will result in
constitutionally permissible bench trials. 3 Of course, jury limitations
comprise but one factor in this balancing process; however, the third
prong of Footnote 10 may determine its outcome if the judge decides the
case is too complex.1 4
A third interpretation of the Ross test suggests that the Court has now
given constitutional status to policy arguments concerning jury limita-
tions in complex civil cases.1 5 The district court's decision in In re Boise
Cascade Securities Litigation6 advances this perspective. Certain share-
holders brought a securities fraud action against a company that had ac-
quired the corporation in which the plaintiffs owned an interest. The de-
ality of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U.L. Rav. 486, 526 (1976)).
70. 5 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.11110], at 117 (2d ed. 1980); see Note, supra note 2,
at 769.
71. For cases employing the Ross test, see for example Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416
U.S. 363 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974). However, neither of these cases
required consideration of the "practical abilities and limitations of juries" because the Court
did not regard the issues as too complex. As one commentator concludes: "[T]he Court
never addressed the question of whether the right to jury trial could be constitutionally
restricted by a test including nonhistoric factors." Kane, Civil Jury Trial: The Case for
Reasoned Iconoclasm, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 11 (1976) (emphasis added). The author takes
exception to Kane's reference to jury limitations as "nonhistoric factors"; see text accompa-
nying notes 132-33 infra.
72. 631 F.2d at 1080.
73. Note, Constitutional Law-Seventh Amendment-Right to a Jury Trial in Complex
Litigation, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 920, 934.
74. Brief for Amicus Curiae IBM Corp. at 27-28, Japanese Elec. Prods.
75. Note, supra note 22, at 792. This view gives more weight to the Ross test than does
the second interpretation. The flaw in this reasoning is that the third prong of Ross is not a
novel interpretation of the seventh amendment. On the contrary, concern over jury limita-
tions was at the very heart of an equity court's decision to exercise its concurrent jurisdic-
tion over an action, thus removing it from the category of "suits at common law." See Part
I infra.
76. 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
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fendant's motion to strike the jury demand was granted. After
determining that the case was beyond a jury's comprehension,7 7 the court
wrote that the third prong of Ross recognizes that the interests of justice
are best served when a jury's limitations are weighed.7 8 The judge was of
the opinion that the third prong of the test is of "constitutional dimen-
sions" and must be seen as a limitation to the right to jury trial under the
seventh amendment.
7 9
Following the decision in Boise Cascade, the district court in California
issued its opinion in ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp.80 The
plaintiff had alleged a violation of the antitrust laws. After the court de-
clared a mistrial due to a jury deadlock, it directed a verdict for the de-
fendant and ruled that in the event of another trial a jury would not hear
the case.
The court determined that considerations of the pre-merger custom"
and the remedy sought 2 alone would have supported arguments for trial
by jury.8 3 Despite these considerations, however, the court labeled the is-
sues "equitable" in nature because of their complexity and the perceived
inability of a jury to render a fair verdict in the case.84
77. Id. at 103.
78. Id. at 104.
79. Id. at 105.
80. 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 639
F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980).
81. With reference to private antitrust actions, the Supreme Court in Fleitman v. Wals-
bach Street Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27, 29 (1916), indicated that "when a penalty of
triple damages is sought to be inflicted, the statute should not be read as attempting
to authorize liability to be enforced otherwise than through the verdict of a jury...
458 F. Supp. at 445.
82. "These same comments [see note 81 supra] are applicable to the consideration of the
second factor deemed significant in Ross v. Bernhard." 458 F. Supp. at 445.
83. It should be recalled that these two elements are generally regarded as a restatement
of the historical test. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
84. 458 F. Supp. at 445. "In this case, more is involved than simply complicated facts.
The accounting and especially the engineering concepts are far beyond the experience and
understanding of an ordinary jury." Id. at 446.
Another district court took an altogether different approach to the characterization of
issues. In Radial Lip Mach., Inc. v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224 (N.D. Ill.
1977), the court indicated that there are two possible interpretations of the Ross text. One
view is that the courts should consider jury limitations at the threshold stage when the
question is whether a right to jury trial exists for the type of claim being asserted. If a claim
is regarded as "legal" in nature (such as the suit for treble damages in ILC Peripherals),
then individual attention is not given to the complexity of a given case. The Radial Lip
court adopted this interpretation.
The other view of Footnote 10, according to Radial Lip, is that the courts should consider
the complexity of issues in every case to determine whether the jury can comprehend them.
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As the following section demonstrates, however, these district courts
did not have to rely solely upon Ross to justify their rulings. Application
of the historical test which embraces the "practical abilities and limita-
tions of juries"85 would have provided adequate grounds for striking jury
demands.
III. THE HISTORICAL TEST
The seventh amendment provides for jury trial only in those instances
where, if viewed historically, the issue or claim would have been tried in a
court of law. 6 The courts customarily examine the issue's classification in
1791, the year of the amendment's adoption.8 7 Moreover, the right to a
jury trial in a civil case is determined by the practices of the courts in
England during the latter part of the eighteenth century.8 Confronted
with a case involving complicated facts and intricate laws, the modem
trial judge should determine whether a chancellor would have enjoined a
party from proceeding at law in lieu of a suit in equity involving the same
dispute.8 9 If this would have been the case in 1791, there is no right to
Apparently, this position was adopted by the ILC Peripherals court, but the Radial Lip
court deemed it overly broad. 76 F.R.D. at 226-27. See generally Note, supra note 12, at
911.
It has been argued, however, that whenever the first two prongs of Ross would require an
impractical result (e.g., trying a claim for treble damages before a jury when the cause of
action is a massive antitrust claim), the Court will then decide whether the issues are legal
or equitable by considering jury limitations. Brief for Amicus Curiae IBM Corp. at 26, Japa-
nese Elec. Prods.
85. The author contends that in addition to the customary treatment of a claim and the
type of remedy sought, jury limitations influenced eighteenth century equity courts in their
decision to exercise jurisdiction over a suit originally brought in a common law court.
86. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2302 (1971).
87. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935); Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases:
English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43, 44 (1980).
88. Baltimore and C. Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935). One commentator
observes that "'[b]eyond all question, the common law here alluded to is not the common
law of any individual state, (for it probably differs in all), but it is the common law of
England, the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence."' Wolfram, supra note 69, at 641
(quoting United States v. Wanson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812)).
89. If equity had concurrent jurisdiction of complex cases, thus giving the chancellor the
discretion to bring [the parties] into the court of chancery [through the issuance of an
injunction], and if the chancellor in fact exercised that discretion to take jurisdiction
over a particular case, then the litigation became a proceeding in equity and, being no
longer a 'suit at common law,' was removed from the scope of the seventh amend-
ment. As the Supreme Court held in Shields v. Thomas, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 253, 262
(1855), the seventh amendment, correctly interpreted, embraces neither the "exclu-
sive jurisdiction of courts of equity, nor that which they have exercised as concurrent
with courts of law."
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jury trial in the modern proceeding.
A. Introduction
By decree of James I, the chancery received the power to enjoin parties
from suing at law and from executing judgments obtained in courts of
law.90 This enabled the courts of chancery to ensure that procedures at
law did not work injustice on the parties.
The common law courts developed their own devices for promoting the
fair treatment of litigants. One such device was the special jury, whose
members possessed extraordinary trade or professional qualifications.91 A
special jury was convened whenever "the causes were of too great nicety
for the discussion of ordinary freeholders."9 2 One commentor contends
that the English courts recognized that certain disputes were beyond the
grasp of the common jury and solved that problem by retaining the jury
but modifying its composition."3
Another device used by common law judges was the removal of certain
difficult issues from the jury. For example, the courts regarded the ques-
tion of whether a seller's covenant not to compete was reasonable as one
of law for the court's resolution in restraint of trade cases, rather than a
question of fact for a jury.9 4 It is apparent that even on the law side of the
English courts, the conventional jury played a limited role.
B. Equitable Jurisdiction in England
1. Inadequacy of Remedies at Law - the Action of Account
Although the most common determinant of equitable jurisdiction was
the nature of the remedy sought,9 the courts also considered the inade-
quacy of the remedy at law. 8 Disputes which may have involved issues
Campbell & Le Poidevin, Complex Cases and Jury Trials: A Reply to Professor Arnold, 128
U. PA. L. REv. 965, 974 n.45 (1980) (emphasis added).
90. P. DEVLIN, NOTE ON THE SUIT AT COMMON LAW IN ENGLAND AT THE TIME OF THE SEV-
ENTH AMENDMENT (1791) 1 15 (1979).
91. P. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 18 (3d ed. 1966).
92. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 357 (Tucker 3d ed. 1803), cited in Oakes, supra
note 20, at 256. By statute in 1730, England gave either side the right to a special jury.
Oakes, supra note 20, at 256. Eventually this practice was discontinued. J. FRANK, supra
note 26, at 143.
93. Oakes, supra note 20, at 256.
94. P. DEVLIN,.supra note 91, at 79; see, e.g., Davis v. Mason, 5 T.R. 118, 101 Eng. Rep.
69 (K.B. 1793).
95. Harris & Liberman, supra note 21, at 627.
96. Id.
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normally considered "legal" were heard in chancery due to certain
problems with common law procedures.9 7
According to Lord Devlin,98 the action of account was one in which the
chancellor commonly recognized the limitations of common law juries and
exercised equity's concurrent jurisdiction over the case. 99 If the transac-
tions between the parties were so complicated that a jury would have
been unable to unravel their accounts, the chancellor looked beyond the
initial characterization of an issue in order to afford just and complete
relief.100
Twentieth century critics of the use of juries in complex civil cases have
drawn an analogy involving the action of account and the modern, com-
plex proceedings. 011 The district court in Bernstein v. Universal Pictures,
Inc.102 struck a jury trial demand based on this analogy. Bernstein was a
class action against certain producers and distributors of motion pictures
and television shows. The court recalled that traditional equity powers
include the authority to strike a jury demand in the interest of justice.10 3
In the opinion of the trial judge "[t]his equitable power was not limited
to the old common law 'action of account,' or by modern notions of ac-
counting procedures.' '0 4 The Bernstein court thus recognized a similarity
between the need for a bench trial in actions of account two hundred
years ago and the need for striking a jury demand in a highly technical
antitrust proceeding today.1
0 5
97. See Comment, supra note 54, at 40; Note, Unfit for Jury Determination Complex
Civil Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Right of Trial by Jury, 20 B.C.L. REv. 511,
525-26 (1979).
98. Lord Devlin is a Lord of Appeal and a leading authority on the jury's role in the
English judicial system. He has received honorary degrees from Oxford and Cambridge Uni-
versities and has written several books and articles in this area.
99. Devlin, supra note 87, at 65. "[I]t is unquestionable that by 1791 accounts were being
taken in equity simply because they were complicated." Id. at 68; see J. STORY, COMMENTA-
RIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 452 (11th ed. 1873).
100. H. MCCLINTOcK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 200 (2d ed. 1948). "Even
where there is no equitable duty to account, a bill . . .may be maintained if the court
regards the remedy at law as inadequate because the account is so complicated that the
procedure at law is not adapted to secure an accurate result." Id. at § 202. Equity's jurisdic-
tion extends to many cases where the account is legal in nature and the items comprising
the account are predicated on legal obligations. J. STORY, supra note 99, at § 442.
101. See Comment, supra note 55, at 41.
102. 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
103. Id. at 66.
104. Id. at 67 (citing Fowle v. Lawrason, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 495 (1831)).
105. The district court in In re United States Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702
(S.D. Cal. 1977), used this rationale to conclude that the inability of a jury to handle a
complex case constitutes an inadequate remedy at law which, therefore, triggers equitable
1981]
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The parallel drawn between an action of account and a complex civil
case has been challenged on several grounds. One objection centers on the
nature of the remedy sought in the latter situation. Historically, damages
is a legal remedy. 108 However, characterization of the remedy was not the
sole factor in deciding whether to exercise equity's concurrent jurisdic-
tion.10 7 A related criticism, peculiar to antitrust actions, is that equity has
been reluctant to entertain actions involving imposition of penalties.10 s
Lord Devlin counters this objection by pointing out that courts of equity
were free to entertain such suits when the obstacle of self-incrimination
was removed. 09
Another criticism of the Bernstein analogy is that jury incompetence
formed a basis for equitable jurisdiction only in cases that involved the
purest form of an action on account. Therefore, it is argued that an ac-
counting was a special type of action which simply cannot be likened to a
modern complex case.1" 0 The Ninth Circuit adopted this position."' How-
ever, during the eighteenth century, the chancery courts entertained a
range of cases in which a request for an accounting based upon, for exam-
ple, tort or contract damages bore little resemblance to the pure form of
the action of account." 2
The Illinois district court perceived another flaw in the accounting/
complex case analogy. In Radial Lip Machine, Inc. v. International Car-
bide Corp.,"5s the court distinguished between complex issues surround-
ing the computation of damages and complicated facts concerning the de-
termination of liability."" While a court of equity may hear a case on the
basis of the former, arguably it does not have jurisdiction as a result of
jurisdiction. This view was rejected on appeal. United States Financial, supra note 6. "[T]he
issues presented here are of a legal nature. The fact that resolution of the issues will involve
an examination of... accounts, and accounting procedures, cannot transform the case into
an action for an equitable accounting." 609 F.2d at 423.
106. Oakes, supra note 20, at 295-96.
107. See notes 95-97 supra and accompanying text.
108. The remedy in an antitrust suit is treble damages. See Oakes, supra note 20, at 259
n.85.
109. Equitable procedures require that responses to discovery be under oath. P. DRVLIN,
supra note 90, at 88. Equity follows the legal principle that no one is obliged to incrimi-
nate himself through his own testimony. Id. When the obstacle of self-incrimination no
longer exists, as in the case where the party seeking the aid of equity consents to the discov-
ery or the penalty, equitable jurisdiction can be exercised. Id. at 1 89, 93.
110. Note, supra note 97, at 526-27.
111. 609 F.2d at 424.
112. Brief for Amicus Curiae IBM Corp. at 26, Rosen v. Dick, 639 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1980).
113. 76 F.R.D. 224 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
114. Id. at 228.
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the latter.1 5
It should be noted, however, that in Ochoa v. American Oil Co.116 the
district court stated that, in extraordinary cases where only a court of
equity acting without a jury could unravel highly complex issues, the ba-
sis for equitable jurisdiction is the inadequacy of remedies at law.1117 Sig-
nificantly, the court failed to limit its reasoning to the determination of
damages alone. 8 Furthermore, the "inadequacy" exception has em-
braced both the procedural as well as the remedial aspects of an action.
Since the inability of a jury to resolve a complex case is a procedural
shortcoming of the adjudicatory process, it is a proper ground for invoca-
tion of the inadequacy exception.119
2. Other Grounds for Equitable Jurisdiction
Although most of the authority that can be cited to justify a complexity
exception falls within the common law action of account model,1 20 there
115. Id. The Radial Lip court cited Judge Sobeloff's opinion in Tights, Inc. v. Stanley,
441 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1971), in support of this distinction. In Tights the Fourth Circuit
argued that the Supreme Court, in United States v. Bitter Root Dev. Co., 200 U.S. 451
(1906), had rejected the argument that equity could take jurisdiction whenever there were
complex issues concerning liability. 441 F.2d at 340-41. The Tights court misconstrued the
opinion in Bitter Root. The relevant language of the Court in Bitter Root appears below.
The principal ground upon which it is claimed that the remedy at law is inadequate is
really nothing more than a difficulty in proving the case against the defendants. The
bill shows that whatever was done in the way of cutting the timber and carrying it
away was done by the defendants as tort feasors, and the various devices alleged to
have been resorted to ... by way of organizing different corporations, in order...
to render it more difficult for the complainant to make proof of his action, does not in
the least tend to give a court of equity jurisdiction on that account.
200 U.S. at 472 (emphasis added).
It is clear from this passage that the Court rejected only the notion that a "difficult" case
may be heard in equity. The Court later interpreted the Bitter Root decision as holding that
"mere complication of facts alone and difficulty of proof are not a basis of equity jurisdic-
tion." Curriden v. Middleton, 232 U.S. 633, 636 (1914) (emphasis added).
Those favoring a complexity exception would suggest that a truly complex case (see notes
11-18 supra and accompanying text) presents more than mere difficulty in proving facts; it
is one in which it is virtually impossible for a panel of laymen to decide. In deciding Bitter
Root, the Court was not confronted with a "complex" case as the term is used in this
Comment.
116. 338 F. Supp. 914 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
117. Id. at 921.
118. The Ochoa decision was cited by the district court in In re United States Financial
Sec. Litig., 75 F.R.D. 702, 710 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
119. Note, supra note 12, at 905.
120. Harris, supra note 21, at 628-29.
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are other instances in which the chancellor took jurisdiction over a dis-
pute out of concern for jury limitations. Two such cases are Towneley V.
Clench'21 and Gyles v. Wilcox, Barrow & Nutt.12' The former involved,
inter alia, the interpretation of books and deeds. At one point in the
opinion, the chancellor deemed himself better qualified to make this in-
terpretation than a "jury of ploughmen." 2 3
Reliance on Clench by proponents of a complexity exception has drawn
criticism from at least one commentator. Professor Arnold notes that the
plaintiff never asserted that equitable jurisdiction rested on the complex
nature of the dispute. 24 Additionally, the decree did not rely upon the
inferiority of a jury as justification for denying the defendant his right to
proceed at common law."25 According to Arnold, equitable jurisdiction ac-
tually rested on a two-fold inadequacy of common law procedures, as op-
posed to the complexity of the case. The procedural problems included
the lack of authority to compel the production of documents and to order
the appearance of witnesses.
1 2 6
These commentators offer a different theory on the basis for Lord
Ellesmere's ruling in Clench. They note that he referred to another ques-
tion raised by the case. In their opinion, this additional inquiry concerned
whether a particular will was legally effective. 27 This complex question of
law thoroughly justifies the court's refusal to allow an action at law on the
121. 21 Eng. Rep. 13 (Ch. 1603). According to Lord Devlin, this is the correct name of the
case despite the fact that it originally appeared as Clench v. Tomley. P. DEvLIN, supra note
91, at Al n.1.
122. 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch. 1740).
123. 21 Eng. Rep. at 13. "Thus, the English common law, invoking equity jurisdiction,
recognized that complex cases could exceed the jury's limitations, thereby rendering the
remedy at law inadequate." Note, The Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Litigation, 20
WM. & MARY L. REV. 329, 332 (1978).
124. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Liti-
gation, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 829, 844 (1980).
125. Id. Professor Arnold adds that Lord Ellesmere's opinion was never cited in subse-
quent decisions, nor were its principles ever invoked. He suggests that this otherwise ob-
scure case was uncovered by those searching for ancient support for a relatively modem
proposition, i.e., a complexity exception to the seventh amendment is constitutionally per-
missible. Id. at 845.
126. Campbell & Le Poidevin, supra note 90, at 979. Professor Arnold fails to recognize
the distinction between grounds for asserting equitable jurisdiction initially and grounds for
refusing to permit a jury to decide a question once equitable jurisdiction has been exercised.
No attempt is made to explain why the chancellor refused to permit jury resolution of this
dispute once certain documents were produced and certain overseas witnesses deposed. Id.
at 979-81.
127. Id. at 984.
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grounds as reported."'
In Gyles the court considered whether, under the terms of the Copy-
right Act, one book was a plagiarized version of another. Lord Hardwicke
refused to direct an issue on this point, holding that "[t]he court is not
under an indispensable obligation to send all facts to a jury, but may
refer them to a master, to state them, where it is a question of nicety and
difficulty, and more fit for men of learning to inquire into, than a common
jury."'28 A careful study of Clench, Gyles and other cases' 30 has led Lord
Devlin to conclude with certainty that a chancellor would have regarded
jury limitations as a major factor to be considered in 1791.131
C. Early Developments in the United States
Because the colonists had very high regard for trial by jury,'32 eigh-
teenth century juries in this country had greater decisionmaking author-
ity than their modern descendants. 133 Notwithstanding this affinity for
the civil jury system, the scope of the seventh amendment must still be
measured by the intentions of the framers. 34 It is clear from the language
and legislative history of this provision that the framers did not intend to
deviate from the English distinction between law and equity. 35 In partic-
ular, it should be recalled that the text of the amendment was drafted by
Madison,'1  and that a predominantly federalist first Congress adopted
128. A jury of ploughmen, in order to decide the general question of title in the ejectment
proceedings, would have needed instruction in the method of disposing of land by will
before the Statute of Uses, the effect of the Statute, the special significance of a death
between 1535 and 1540, and the possible ways in which a will might take effect de-
spite the Statute. If this exposition has been lengthy and tedious, it would equally
have taxed the mind of a seventeenth century juror.
Id. at 984-85.
129. 26 Eng. Rep. at 490-91.
130. See P. DEVLIN, supra note 90, where the author has compiled a list of many cases
which are discussed in the appendix thereto.
131. Devlin, supra note 87, at 107.
132. Arnold, supra note 124, at 833.
133. Id. "Most of the jury control techniques which modern lawyers take for granted were
simply unknown in early American practice, and the other technical devices which have as
their aim and effect the control of the jury were unavailable as well." Id. at 833-34.
134. Campbell & Le Poidevin, supra note 89, at 967.
135. Id.
136. An ideological colleague of Madison addressed this question when he wrote:
[Tihe circumstances that constitute cases proper for courts of equity are in many
instances so nice and intricate, that they are incompatible with the genius of trials by
jury. They require often such long, deliberate, and critical investigation as would be
impracticable to men called from their occupations, and obliged to decide before they
were permitted to return to them. . . .[T]he litigations usual in chancery frequently
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the final version.137 The federalists did not share the same view of the
civil jury format as those anti-federalists who fought for the inclusion of
the seventh amendment. Thus, it cannot be said that the founding fa-
thers intended to require a jury in protracted, complicated cases, such as
antitrust or securities matters, which are totally beyond a jury's
comprehension.l s'5
IV. DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS
The remaining theory in support of a complexity exception is that jury
trials in complex cases violate due process. Rather than invoking the Ross
test or the historical analysis, the Third Circuit based its decision in Jap-
anese Electronic Products on the need to ensure fundamental fairness.139
In the court's words, "[a] jury that cannot understand the evidence and
the legal rules to be applied provides no reliable safeguard against errone-
ous decisions. "140
The Third Circuit perceived a conflict between the fifth and seventh
amendments1 4' and determined that under appropriate circumstances the
right to a jury trial must yield to the right to a fair trial.142 The better
comprehend a long train of minute and independent particulars.
A. HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST No. 83, 549-50 (Mod. Lib. C. Ed.).
137. Brief for Amicus Curiae IBM Corp. at 20, Rosen v. Dick, 639 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1980).
An examination of the history of the amendment yields two conclusions. First, the colonists
insisted upon preserving the right to jury trial in certain civil cases. Second, the amendment
adhered to the English practice of reserving some factfinding for the chancellor. Campbell &
Le Poidevin, supra note .89, at 973.
138. Kirkham, supra note 26, at 209. According to one line of reasoning, the historical
test should not be a static inquiry into the past. In light of the Supreme Court's decisions in
Beacon Theatres, Dairy Queen, and Ross it would seem ill-advised to confine equity's juris-
diction to those complex cases which fall within a particular historical category. Note, supra
note 12, at 906.
139. 631 F.2d at 1084-85.
140. Id. at 1084. The court believed that an incompetent jury can undermine the ability
of a district court to dispense justice. Id. One commentator has written that "[a]t a mini-
mum, a fair trial requires that the finder of fact be able to comprehend the issues of a case
and render a rational verdict based upon a reasoned understanding of those issues." Com-
ment, The Seventh Amendment and Complex Civil Litigation: The Demise of the Com-
plexity Exception to Trial by Jury and the Search for a Viable Due Process Alternative,
50 Miss. L.J. 572, 600 (1979); see Kirkham, supra note 26, at 208.
141. 631 F.2d at 1084; see Oakes, supra note 20, at 246; Note, supra note 97, at 524-25.
142. 631 F.2d at 1086. The court arrived at this conclusion after balancing the interests.
Id. at 1084-86. One writer points out that the seventh amendment is one of a very few
provisions of the Bill of Rights which has not been applied to the states through the four-
teenth amendment. He suggests that the right to jury trial is not considered to be as impor-
tant as notions of fundamental fairness through procedural due process. Comment, supra
note 140, at 615.
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reasoned view, however, is that the seventh amendment embraces the
concept of due process and that the two amendments are actually in har-
mony.143 The Supreme Court implicitly recognized this interpretation in
Ross.
144
To determine whether it is appropriate to strike a demand for jury trial
in a particular case it is necessary to apply the balancing test enunciated
by the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.4" The initial question in this two-
tiered analysis is whether a property interest within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment is at stake.46 Clearly, this
hurdle is overcome in a complex civil case if the plaintiff seeks damages.
In the second tier, three factors must be weighed to determine whether
the denial of a jury is constitutionally permissible: (1) the private interest
to be affected, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of this private
interest if conventional procedures are used, and the probable value of
the proposed procedural safeguards, and (3) the Government's interest in
avoiding undue burden and expense by using the proposed safeguards. 147
With respect to the first consideration, an adverse judgment could de-
prive the defendant of just compensation for his injuries. Regarding the
second factor, Part I of this Comment demonstrates that in a complex
case a judge is a more reliable decisionmaker than a jury.148 Finally, the
use of a judge as a factfinder will actually be in the government's best
interests since jury trials run longer than bench trials 49 and may be in-
conclusive. 10 Judicial resources and taxpayer dollars are preserved when
judges replace juries in complex litigation. 5,
Thus, a strong due process argument can be advanced in favor of judi-
cial assumption of factfinding duties in complex litigation.' 52 However,
the Ninth Circuit refused to accept it,'53 asserting that the two premises
143. But see Note, supra note 22, at 798 (arguing that this approach rejects both history
and precedent).
144. See Note, supra note 12, at 910-11.
145. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
146. Id. at 332.
147. Id. at 335.
148. See notes 19-51 supra and accompanying text.
149. "[O]n the average it takes 40 percent longer to try a case to a jury than to a judge."
Schaefer, Is the Adversary System Working in Optimal Fashion?, 70 F.R.D. 159, 161 (1976)
(citing H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, DELAY IN THE CouRT ch. 6 (1959)).
150. See, e.g., ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. at 448 (mistrial
was declared due to a deadlocked jury).
151. In ILC Peripherals the judge noted that the government paid over $32,000 to the
members of the jury for their time. Id.
152. See Comment, supra note 140, at 604-12.
153. In re United States Financial See. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
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on which the argument rests are erroneous.5 4 The author believes the
Ninth Circuit underestimated the problems posed by a complex case 5
and overestimated the abilities of the jury which typically hears such a
case.
1 56
It has also been suggested that the prospective nature of this proposed
application of the due process standard weakens the case in favor of the
complexity exception. 5 7 According to this line of thought, a denial of
jury trial is "in the nature of anticipatory relief, since at the time the
mode of trial is determined, the injury is merely threatened.'1 58 The re-
sult is that vested seventh amendment rights are revoked due to some
anticipated deprivation of due process. Critics believe this to be an unac-
ceptably harsh encroachment on the right to jury trial.159
This position ignores the Supreme Court's decision in Fidelity and De-
posit Co. v. United States. s0 In this case, the Court upheld the use of
summary judgment against a claim that this procedural device denies a
party the right to trial by jury. 8 " In granting partial summary judgment,
the trial judge orders removal of certain decisionmaking power from the
jury based on his own evaluation of the case. 16 2 This procedure resembles
that of a denial of jury trial which is predicated on the judge's conclusion
that a jury could not render a rational decision. Accordingly, "[i]f a judge
concludes that a contemporary jury would be unable to perform its
factfinding function in a manner consistent with the goals of truth and
fairness the jury system was intended to promote, the judge can strike the
jury without violating the . . . seventh amendment."' 63
446 U.S. 929 (1980).
154. Id. at 427. The court apparently believed that (1) no case is beyond the comprehen-
sion of a jury and (2) that juries are composed of highly capable individuals.
155. See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
156. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
157. Note, supra note 97, at 533.
158. Id. at 534 (emphasis added).
159. Id.
160. 187 U.S. 315 (1902).
161. Id. at 319-21. Summary judgment is granted whenever there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. Civ. P.
56(c).
162. In effect, the judge determines that a jury could render only one decision.
163. Oakes, supra note 20, at 245. Contrary to the holding in Hurwitz v. Hurwitz, 136
F.2d 796, 798-99 (D.C. Cir. 1943), under due process analysis a defendant does have the
constitutional right to a trial by a court sitting without a jury.
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V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has surveyed the various theories that support a com-
plexity exception to the seventh amendment. Because juries are inappro-
priate in complex civil trials, the courts must decide upon a legally sound
basis for striking jury demands under difficult circumstances. The author
submits that the historical test serves this purpose well. Standing by it-
self, the Ross footnote is not as persuasive. Moreover, the due process
argument rests upon the unpopular notion that the fifth and seventh
amendments can be harmonized. It is incumbent upon the Supreme
Court to resolve this controversy. By denying certiorari in cases which
have confronted these problems, the Court perpetuates the injustice
worked by those district courts that are unwilling to ensure rational deci-
sionmaking through bench trials of complex civil cases.
Barrett E. Pope

